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Abstract 
This article considers what it means for citizens to trust the police and criminal courts. 
First, a broad definition of trust it outlined. Four theories of trust formation and 
reproduction are then used to derive a set of propositions concerning the sources of trust 
in the legal system and the factors that sustain and/or undermine it. A brief review of 
existing criminological research that provides evidence as to the relevance of these 
factors is also provided. The article closes with a discussion of the relationship between 
the concepts of trust and legitimacy in the context of the criminal justice system. 
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The issue of public trust in the police is a mainstay of criminological research. The 1983 
Policing for London study (Smith and Gray 1985) heralded a run of books, journal 
articles and research reports that continues to this day in the United Kingdom. A similar 
research tradition exists in the United States, Canada and other Anglophone countries. 
Scholars from across the world have started to assess public trust in the police in their 
own country (e.g. Tankebe, 2009; Kochel et al. 2013; Jonathan-Zamir and Weisburd 
2013; Bradford et al. 2014; Cheng 2015) and mount ambitious comparative analyses 
spanning multiple jurisdictions (Jackson et al. 2011; Hough et al. 2013; Nivette 2016). 
And while the tradition of research into trust in the courts is less well developed, with 
research into trust in other aspects of the criminal justice system even less so, interest 
here too has been relatively consistent over the years. In the United States, for example, 
Gallup have included a measure of ‘trust and confidence’ in the judicial branch of the 
federal government in national polls since 1972. 
 While many issues motivate scholarly interest in this topic, two are of most note. 
First, there is a widespread acceptance in academic and policy circles that it is 
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normatively desirable that people should be able to trust a justice system that has an 
unusually intrusive set of powers to coerce, detain (and protect) them. People have the 
right to live in a society that has justice institutions that that can be trusted; at the very 
least the absence of trust indicates a problematic relationship between citizens and legal 
authorities. Second, the legal systems of democratic countries require, as a matter of 
empirical fact, the trust of citizens to function. Police and courts need the cooperation of 
citizens as providers of information, as witnesses, as jurors, and as assistants in the 
reproduction of order. People are unlikely to report a crime to the police, for instance, if 
they distrust officers to act effectively and fairly.  
   In this article we consider what it means for citizens to trust the police and 
criminal courts. We outline our broad understanding of trust as a concept; we consider 
the relevance of four theories of trust formation and reproduction; we use these theories 
to derive a set of propositions concerning the sources of trust in the legal system and the 
factors that sustain and/or undermine it; and we provide a brief review of existing 
criminological research that provides evidence as to the relevance of these factors. The 
article closes with a discussion of some of the similarities and differences between trust 
and legitimacy in the context of a system of authority-relations  that is founded on both 
consent and coercion.  
 
Trust in justice institutions 
Consider first what PytlikZillig et al. (2015), in their review of reviews, describe as the 
triad of subject (a trustor), object (a trustee) and relationship (interdependent but 
involving some degree of risk and shared interest). The subject (trustor) that concerns us 
here is the citizen: as an individual able to make free choices based, in part, on rational 
calculation; as a person with a particular personal background, trajectory and set of 
motivations; and as a member of various social groups that structure, enable and 
constrain attitudes and possibilities for action in multiple ways and at multiple levels.  
The object (trustee) is the relevant criminal justice agency. Some of these have the 
characteristic of being at once an organization and an institution. They comprise 
particular ‘real’ organizational entities (e.g. a specific police force) that are to a 
significant degree coterminous with institutions (e.g. “the police”), where the latter are 
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defined as “… interlocking double-structure(s) of persons-as-role-holders or office-
bearers … and of social practices involving both expressive and practical aims and 
outcomes” (Harre 1979: 98). One implication of this is, for example, that any one police 
organization (the London Metropolitan Police Service, say, or the New York Police 
Department) can and does ‘stand’ in the eyes of citizens for the institution of police, and 
therefore perhaps for other police organizations in the same jurisdiction. Symmetrically, 
people’s (imagined) relationship with the institution of police will colour their 
relationships with specific police organizations. In this article we use, primarily, the 
abstract language of ‘insitutions’ and ‘authorities’, but it is important to remember that 
the discussion likely applies also to organizations. 
While some have argued that it makes little sense to talk of trust in institutions 
(e.g. Hardin 2013), not least because it is difficult to conceive of institutions as “caring” 
or “intending” (PytlikZillig et al. 2015: 11), we share the view of PytlikZillig and 
colleagues that it is meaningful to talk of institutional trust precisely because people 
anthropomorphize institutions. This point is especially relevant in the context of policing, 
where the image of the police officer, as well as of particular police organizations, is 
steeped in social and cultural meaning, where the individual actor represents and 
embodies the institution to a significant degree, and where the police comprise a visible, 
apprehendable presence in the lives of most citizens that is not ‘faceless,’ but is instead 
associated with a variety of more or less imagined, but nevertheless ‘real’, social 
personas.  
Relevant here is Hardin’s (2006) suggestion that stereotyping is important in the 
development of trust relations, at least in as much that stereotypes can be used to help 
form trust judgments when other sources of information are lacking. People have a range 
of stereotypical views of ‘the police officer’ – positive ones might include figures of 
authority in their neighbourhood (Sunshine and Tyler 2003), an avuncular representative 
of community (Reiner 2010), and an effective crime fighter – and at least some of these 
positive views may promote trust. The figure of the judge may provide a similar 
personification, this time of the court system, providing a basis of a set of similarly 
stereotyped assumptions in relation to fairness and impartiality, as well, perhaps, as some 
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less positive stereotypes concerning elitism, class prejudice and a lack of awareness of 
the modern world. 
 Finally, relationship refers to the interdependence of subject and object without 
which it makes little or no sense to talk of trust, and here again, we follow PytlikZillig et 
al. (2015:11) and others (e.g. Schoorman et al. 2015) in suggesting that, while trust is by 
definition relational, it is not necessarily reciprocal, in that it is meaningful to speak of 
the subject trusting the object even where the object does not, and even cannot, trust the 
subject. This distinction is clearly relevant in the current context – while individual police 
officers may or not trust citizens or ‘the public’, it would take a significant conceptual 
leap to suggest that ‘the police’, as organization or institution, can or might trust 
individual citizens. 
 
Willingness to be vulnerable 
The second way in which we draw on PytlikZillig et al.’s review is in following the 
definition of trust that is attracting a growing consensus in the literature. People who trust 
criminal justice institutions are ‘…willing to rely upon, give control to, or otherwise ‘be 
vulnerable to’” those institutions under conditions of risk’ (2015: 9). Thus envisaged, 
trust in legal authorities involves consideration of both (i) the future behaviour of specific 
individual actors whom one can come to rely upon for valued actions or outcomes, and 
(ii) beliefs about the behaviour of ‘role-holders’ (e.g. police officers, judges) in relation to 
social regulation and the production of order. For example, people who trust the police 
are willing to rely upon and be vulnerable towards the police, whether this means specific 
officers or the institution of “police”. Such trust refers, on the face of it, to both the ability 
of officers to intrude in people’s lives to enforce the law and the power of officers to 
control crime and maintain order – to police behaviour, that is, that might produce valued 
outcomes in which the individual has a significant stake and which are inherently ‘risky’ 
(not least because such efforts might fail or the individual might find themselves on the 
wrong end of police misbehaviour). 
 From this perspective, trust in criminal justice actors is a process (PytlikZillig et 
al 2015: 29) that resides not simply in people’s attitudes or orientations toward the police 
or courts, nor solely in the actions they take in relation to these institutions, but in the 
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more complex interplay between the two. PytlikZillig and colleagues refer to Möllering 
(2013) to expand this point, arguing that: 
 
“...trust-as-process includes recognizing that ‘trusting’ involves both mental and 
social processes (i.e. both psychological and behavioural aspects), occurs and 
changes over time, involves information processing and learning (e.g. about 
trustworthiness, risk and contexts of trust), and also can result in – for the trustor 
and the trustee – changed personal identities and institutional structures and 
practices” (2015: 30) 
 
It is this understanding of trust that informs our discussion of the ways in which trust in 
criminal justice institutions is generated, reproduced and (perhaps) undermined, and to 
thinking about what it means to trust the police or courts. To organise this discussion we 
draw on four theories of trust that attend not only to what trust is, but also (and more 
importantly) to how it is formed, reproduced or lost:  
 
 the relational account associated with theorists such as Russell Hardin (2006);  
 the value-based notion propounded by Eric Uslaner (2002);  
 Anthony Gidden’s (1991) concept of trust as a complexity-reducing mechanism; 
and, 
 research in social psychology that stresses that trust emerges from value-bearing 
narratives (Earle and Cvetkovich 1995).  
 
We choose these four accounts because they complement, as well as contrast with, one 
another in different ways – and because each has something to say about the ways in 
which trust in the police and courts might vary over space and time (see Bradford et al. 
2016 for an empirical application of some of the ideas outlined below).  
 
Institutions of justice 
At the outset, we should say that we do not address trust in the law, because to our minds 
it makes little sense to say that someone trusts the law. The law is an enforceable code of 
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conduct that represents a set of legal duties. The law is not a trustee; it has no agency or 
independent volition. One does not rely on the behaviour of the law, nor can one be 
vulnerable in relation to the law. While trust does not need to be entirely reciprocal, the 
trustee does need to be an intentional actor. One could break the law or be falsely 
accused, and feel vulnerable to potential actions from law enforcement and courts 
officials, but that refers to trust in institutions that administrate justice, not to trust in the 
law. The law is like a heavy rock – it can harm or crush a person, but it has to be moved 
by another in order to do so. 
Before we consider the four perspectives on trust, we should also draw out some 
preliminary differences between the police and courts. First, while both are popular topics 
of TV and film drama, citizens generally have more personal knowledge of – and 
interaction with – police officers compared to judges and court officials. Second, police 
have regulatory power over us in many walks of life, but court officials only have such 
power in a court situation. This means that people are more routinely exposed to police 
authority than that of  the courts. Third, both the police and courts engage in social 
regulation, the administration of justice, and the production of order, but citizens are 
more reliant on the police (a more salient and pervasive social control mechanism) and 
police are more reliant on citizens. The degree of interdependence between trustor and 
trustee will be stronger with respect to the police compared with court officials.  
Throughout the following discussion we assume that people have a tendency to 
anthropomorphize in a way that conflates individual actor and institution; by which we 
mean that while they may, in a given context, focus on individual actors, these always 
embody to some extent the institution. Conversely, people draw inferences about the 
trustworthiness of particular police officers and court officials, and will act in ways that 
represent a willingness to be vulnerable to these individuals, based on their conception of 
the wider institutions. The intentions and capabilities of individual actors will be 
important not only in their own right but also because they stand for the intentions and 
capabilities of the relevant institution (and vice versa), although this is not to claim that 
people are not capable of drawing a distinction between the individual officers, particular 
organizations, and the institution as a whole. 
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Four perspectives on trust in the police and courts 
 
Knowledge-based, relational, trust 
Hardin makes three claims about trust that are particularly relevant for current purposes. 
First, he stresses that trust is based in knowledge of other’s trustworthiness; trust is 
cognitive since it depends on judgements about character of the potentially trusted other. 
“To say we trust you means we believe you have the right intentions toward us and that 
you are competent to do what we trust you to do” (Hardin 2006: 17). The trustor does not 
choose to trust; relevant knowledge of the abilities and intentions of the trustee instead 
comprise trust. Trust thus emerges when the trustor has relevant knowledge about the 
trustee (or does not emerge, if what they know about a potential trustee does not indicate 
capability and/or appropriate intentions). An important aside is that trust is here both 
past- and future-oriented (or as Hardin puts it, trust is based in assessments and 
expectations); knowledge of abilities and intentions refer to events and experiences that 
have already taken place, yet also comprise assumptions about events yet to transpire. 
Both factors must be present in people’s minds for us to consider their knowledge 
constitutive of trust. 
Second, Hardin places emphasis on the relational aspect of trust that is formed 
and maintained because both parties have an interest in maintaining a reciprocal 
relationship with the other. The trustor has a need to trust the trustee, a reason for coming 
to a judgement about their abilities and intentions, that is inevitably future-oriented. We 
need trust when we need to make judgements about the likely future behavior of another, 
but equally, the trustee must know something of the trustor to be able to anticipate their 
needs and priorities (to be able to have the right intentions in relation to their interests) 
and must also have an interest maintaining their relationship with the trustor. Without 
such a need, they would have no reason to demonstrate competency and right intentions. 
It is for this reason that Hardin speaks of trust as encapsulated interests – I trust you when 
“you encapsulate my interest in your own” (2006: 8, emphasis in original).  
This idea sits comfortably alongside many years of research that has shown, first, 
the importance of trust in shaping the legitimacy criminal justice institutions require for 
their continued existence (Jackson et al. 2012; Tyler and Huo 2002) and second, the 
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extent to which criminal justice agencies expend time and effort attempting to convince 
those they govern that they are, indeed, trustworthy (Hohl et al. 2010; Mawby 2002; 
Salisbury 2004; Singer and Cooper 2008 Criminal justice agencies in democratic states 
rely on the trust of citizens to a significant degree; at the very least, their job is made that 
much harder when trust is low. Police and other criminal justice actors therefore have an 
active interest in encapsulating the interests of citizens within their own and acting in 
ways that generate and reproduce trust among those they govern (which is not to claim, 
of course, that police and courts do not frequently behave in ways that undermine trust). 
 Third, if “we trust only those with whom we have a rich enough relationship to 
judge them trustworthy” (Hardin 2006: 18) then trust is based in pre-existing 
relationships that both parties imagine will continue into the future. If this were not the 
case, there would be no reason for the trustee to behave in a relationship-maintaining 
fashion, i.e. do what they were trusted to do, and/or the cognitive condition of trust would 
not arise because the trustor would not need to come to a judgement about ability and 
intentions. An important implication of Hardin’s notion of trust is, therefore, that 
personal experience matters with regard to trust as well as future willingness to cooperate 
with the police. Direct contact with potential trust objects is an important moment in 
which information is gathered on which subsequent trust judgements can be based. This 
accords with a significant volume of research demonstrating a strong set of association 
between personal contact with police, trust and willingness to cooperate with the police in 
the future (Skogan 2006; Bradford et al. 2009; Jackson et al. 2013; Bradford and Myhill 
2014, and see below). 
  
Trust as moral value 
A quite different view of trust emerges from the work of Eric Uslaner (2002). Starting 
from an explicit critique of the notion of ‘knowledge-based’ or strategic trust, Uslaner 
posits that trust is first and foremost a moral value, based not in personal experiences, but 
in a particular view of life: “trust is not about having faith in particular people or even 
groups of people. It is a general outlook on human nature and mostly does not depend 
upon personal experiences or upon the assumption that others are trustworthy” (2002: 
17). On this account, trust primarily emerges from a moral viewpoint that will be 
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unevenly distributed across a given population and which suggests others are worthy 
recipients of trust, premised on a:  
 
“belief that others share your fundamental moral values and therefore should be 
treated as you would wish to be treated by them. The values they share may vary 
from person to person. What matters is a sense of connection with others because 
you see them as members of your community whose interests must be taken 
seriously” (2002: 18). 
 
Uslaner develops this idea in a variety of ways pertinent to the current discussion. 
On the one hand, he quotes Fukuyama: “Trust arises when a community shares a set of 
moral values in such a way as to create regular expectations of regular and honest 
behaviour” (1995: 153). A measure of fundamental similarity between trustor and trustee 
is supposed, and there is also, as with Hardin, an emphasis on standardized and familiar 
contexts that allow regular expectations to be formed. On the other hand, he stresses that 
moralistic trust is based on a general expectation of the goodwill of others (2002: 18). All 
this aspect of trust rests on is a sense of general shared humanity; it does not require, for 
example, a pre-existing community and shared set of moral values. An important 
implication here would seem to be that personal experience of potential trust object is less 
important (compared to Hardin’s account), since trust is based on judgements about 
intrinsic moral worthiness rather than performance or behaviour. 
Uslaner also draws a strong distinction between particularized and generalized 
trust. Particularized trustors draw the boundaries of the moral community tight; they 
include only family and immediate friends in their moral community – only these people 
are seen to be worthy of trust based on moral values. For particularized trustors, strategic 
trust is relatively more important, and they will in a general sense be less trusting since 
they believe the number of people it is worth trusting is small. Generalized trustors, by 
contrast, draw the boundaries of the moral community more widely. They include many 
more, and even all, people in their moral community; moralistic trust is therefore more 
important for them. Generalized trustors are inclined, indeed motivated, to trust a much 
wider range of individuals and corporate actors than particularized trustors. Finally, 
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generalized trust is ‘thin’, based only loosely on social ties, and particularized trust is 
‘thick’, based on strong social ties. Particularized trust is also ubiquitous, since almost 
everyone trusts someone, and, Uslaner seems to suggest, stronger since “We place our 
highest levels of trust in people we interact with most closely and who are most like 
ourselves” (30); in addition, “We are predisposed to trust our own kind more than out-
groups”  (31). 
Uslaner thus develops a notion of trust that has much in common with that 
developed in the literature on procedural justice. Drawing on the seminal work of Tom 
Tyler and colleagues (e.g. Tyler 2006; Tyler and Blader 2000; Tyler and Huo 2002), this 
literature is primarily concerned with the importance of procedural fairness – a term 
which relates to notions of respect, dignity, voice, equity and neutrality – to people when 
they are interacting with authority figures such as, precisely, police officers. A large 
corpus of empirical work has found that in their dealings with legal authorities people 
appear to place more emphasis on the fairness of the process than on the outcome 
obtained, and when they feel fairly treated they are more likely to trust, legitimize and 
cooperate with the authority. The importance of fairness in people’s relationships with 
legal authorities revolves around the fact that those authorities represent social groups 
most find important, which have been variously characterized as the nation, the state or 
the community. When authorities treat people fairly it communicates a sense of shared 
group membership (Bradford et al. 2014) and that the authority is a ‘proto-typical’ 
representative of the group (Sunshine and Tyler 2003). In other words, procedural justice 
strengthens the bonds between individual and authority and motivates a sense that they 
have a shared social identity. This, in turn, encourages a sense of trust, particularly in 
relation to perceptions of the motives the authority (Tyler and Huo 2002) precisely 
because, in Uslaner’s terms, it encourages a sense that authority figures are in an 
important sense ‘like us’.  
 
Trust as complexity reduction mechanism 
The third notion of trust considered here comes from the work of Anthony Giddens. 
Concerned with the ways people react to, deal with and at least some of the time benefit 
from the conditions of ‘high modernity’, in Modernity and Self-Identity (1991) Giddens 
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positions trust as a characteristic of the individual – or a facet of individual behaviour – 
which enables people living under the otherwise overwhelming complexity of the late 
modern condition to ‘bracket out’ this complexity and thus experience the world as 
understandable, coherent to and manageable by human actors. Trust provides for a sense 
of “ontological security” and is an aspect of the individual’s “practical consciousness” 
(Giddens 1991: 36) that allows them to act despite the complexity of modern life. 
 This capacity is linked explicitly to the pre-eminence of expert systems in high 
modernity. These are forms of technical knowledge and practice that have “validity 
independent of the practitioners and clients that make use of them” (ibid: 18), which 
channel and make useful the vastly increased store of human knowledge and potential in 
a process that relies on people’s willingness to trust the system rather than the individual. 
On this account, one reason why modern health systems, to take an institution unrelated 
to the justice system, are so effective and empowering is because we trust health 
institutions – as systems of expert knowledge – independently of our knowledge of 
individual health practitioners. Without such trust – or when it is undermined for some 
reason – our propensity and ability to make use of the health system is diminished 
because it has become ‘disembedded’ (ibid.) from our immediate social contexts and 
knowledge of individual people. The health system does not and cannot rely on 
immediate social bonds between actors to function, and we cannot rely on our 
relationships with specific individuals to use it. In short, we trust ‘doctors’ (as well as, 
frequently, ‘this doctor’ – individual relationships of course continue to play a role) and 
this trust enables action. If we do not trust doctors, conversely, an avenue for action is 
closed off, or at least obstructed. 
 The resonance here with policing and the provision of security is strong. Acting 
‘as if’ we know justice institutions can provide at least a basic level of security – or, more 
concretely, that they are effective and well-intentioned – enables action, for example by 
generating a sense of confidence that if a misfortune or threat arises help and support can 
be invoked and summoned. Equally, trust provides reassurance that justice institutions 
will not employ their power to arrest and apprehend in unjust ways. Indeed, it is precisely 
because no one can concretely ‘know’ these things, and because there is always a risk 
that, for example, police will not attend if summoned, or will misuse their power if they 
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do, that the concept of trust (or distrust) is such a useful way to understand the 
relationship between people and justice instiutions. 
Three further aspects of Giddens’ concept of trust are particularly pertinent here. 
First, he insists,  trust cannot by definition be based on full knowledge – if we knew the 
police would come when called we would not need to trust them. Rather, trust “presumes 
a leap to commitment, a quality of ‘faith’ which is irreducible” (ibid: 19). Smith (2007) 
has made precisely this point when discussing the formation of public trust in the police. 
Second, like Uslaner, Giddens conceives of a significant portion of individuals’ 
propensity to trust as stemming from their early socialization and therefore, if not innate, 
as a deeply held character trait. Drawing on the psychoanalysis of DW Winnicot, 
Giddens argues that: “The trust which the child, in normal circumstances, vests in its 
caretakers … can be seem as a sort of emotional inoculation against existential anxieties 
– a protection against future threats and dangers” (ibid. 39), and that this trust carried 
forward into adult life. Again, we are left with the idea that trust enables action – but also 
that some people will be more predisposed to trust than others. 
Third, however, unlike Uslaner, Giddens stresses the reflexive nature of trust  
(and of modernity in general). While some people may be predisposed to trust they will 
assess the behavior of trustees and reconsider their opinions in the light of evidence. 
Giddens thus presents something of a ‘third way’ (pun intended) between Hardin and 
Uslaner, in that he suggests trust stems from both personal characteristics (propensities to 
trust) and experience. 
 
Trust in value-bearing narratives 
The idea that trust is both a complexity reducing mechanism and intimately bound up 
with risk also emerges from the work of Earle and Cvetkovich (Earle and Cvetkovich 
1995; 1999). Like Uslaner, they argue that trust is primarily a within-group phenomenon, 
although, also like Uslaner they distinguish between what they term pluralistic trust, 
premised in the shared past of particular groups, and cosmopolitan trust, which is created 
out the emergence of new combinations of people and groups (the latter, they argue, is 
well suited to the task of cognitively dealing with risk as it can emerge at precisely the 
point people embark on new, and therefore uncertain, endeavors). 
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 What concerns us here, however, is Earle and Cvetkovich’s emphasis on what 
they call ‘value bearing narratives’ in the emergence and maintenance of trust. On this 
account, social trust is “based on value similarity: people tend to trust other people and 
institutions that ‘tell stories’ expressing currently salient values, stories that interpret the 
world in the same way they do” (1999: 21). This notion of trust is relevant here because 
the police, courts and other criminal justice institutions are intimately caught up in a 
whole set of stories people tell themselves about the nature and condition of their 
neighbourhood, community and nation. As Loader and Mulcahy (2003: 39) argue, police 
can serve as a condensing symbol (Turner 1974) around which people can cohere a set of 
meanings and understandings that give structure to their social worlds. Almost inevitably, 
given the nature of these institutions, these stories will revolve around values and the 
conflict between values – issues of right and wrong, recognition and misrecognition, 
order and disorder. In addition justice institutions are constantly forming and reforming a 
narrative about themselves, as a way of claiming relevance, in asserting their legitimacy 
(Bottoms and Tankebe 2011), and in their role as ‘legitimate namers’ (Loader and 
Mulcahy 2003: 46), empowered to make definitive statements in relation to particular 
individuals, groups and circumstances. To the extent the narratives told by, about and in 
relation to the police and courts correspond with people’s own values, then trust will 
emerge and be sustained. To the extent that the narrative told by and about police clashes 
with people’s values, however, then trust will be damaged or undermined. 
 
The nature and sources of trust in justice institutions  
We have taken the time to discuss the four notions of trust outlined above, as we think all 
have relevance when thinking about trust in justice institutions. This relevance can be 
summed up in seven propositions, which comprise a multi-dimensional model of trust 
that draws on concepts of relational and moral or value-driven trust. 
 
1) Trust in legal authorities is primarily cognitive. One’s willingness to be 
vulnerable to such authorities is founded in beliefs one has concerning their 
current and likely future behaviors. This ‘knowledge’ may be explicit, tacit or 
simply assumed, and may be garnered from many different sources. 
 14 
2) Trust relates to beliefs about ability and intentions. Trust in the police and courts 
is premised on beliefs that they are effective in the tasks set them and well 
intentioned towards those they govern and serve. 
3) Trust is based in part on direct and indirect experience of criminal justice actors, 
particularly in relation to their abilities and intentions. These are important 
moments in which the beliefs that constitute trust are formed. A necessary 
corollary is then that there is significant overlap between trust – or distrust – in 
particular police officers (for example) and the institution of police, albeit that 
these will not collapse into each other. 
4) Yet, trust is also based on generalized motivations to trust. In particular, people 
will be motivated to trust criminal justice institutions when and to the extent that 
they believe those institutions share group membership with themselves and/or 
represent social groups to which they feel they belong. 
5) Trust is also generated and reproduced by the place of institutions within specific 
value bearing narratives. People will trust those institutions when they believe 
they represent, enact and even embody values they share. 
6) Trust in criminal justice institutions always, in the final analysis, involves a leap 
of faith. People cannot truly know – have justified true belief – that criminal 
justice actors and institutions are effective and well intentioned, but many are 
willing to indicate they believe these things to be true.  
7) Both truster and trustee have interests in maintaining trust-based relationships. 
For individual citizens this trust reduces complexity, opens up possibilities for 
action, and may be closely related to their sense of self and ontological security. 
For justice authorities trust serves to garner cooperation from citizens, and is 
intimately linked to the legitimacy required to maintain their continued existence. 
 
This model of trust in legal institutions supposes that trust emerges from different 
sources, that it is a characteristic of various sets of social relationships, and that 
assessments and expectations of competency and intentions relate both to specific 
encounters with justice agents (e.g. people come to an opinion on the effectiveness and 
intentions of the police subsequent to contact with police officers) and crystalize 
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thoughts, feelings and emotions developed in other, often quite different ways (e.g. 
people are motivated to believe police are effective and well-intentioned when they feel 
they share a social identity with police). 
Returning to the notion that trust is a ‘willingness to be vulnerable’, based on the 
account above there two ways of assessing what trust in justice authorities actually ‘is’. 
One is that beliefs/knowledge concerning abilities and intentions are psychologically 
separate from, and feed into, such readiness – that trust in legal authorities is, precisely, a 
process that is premised on assessments of competency and right intentions but which is 
crystallized in a willingness to be vulnerable. The other possibility is that 
beliefs/knowledge concerning abilities and intentions are psychologically inseparable 
from vulnerability (indeed people may find it hard to imagine not being vulnerable to, or 
in some sense reliant on, justice authorities, making any sense of willed vulnerability 
subordinate to assessments of competency and intentions). Which of these 
conceptualizations is correct is largely an empirical matter, and it would be fascinating to 
investigate which is best supported by real world data (see below).  
The model also implies that the most relevant form of knowledge people have of 
criminal justice institutions is ‘tacit’. That is, the things we believe we know about 
criminal justice institutions  – which constitute our trust – seem to be based in ‘knowing 
more than we can tell’, to use Karl Polanyi’s phrase (1966: 4). Many people will happily 
say the police or courts are effective and believe this to be true, despite (a) the fact that 
they do not, and probably can not, know this in a formal sense and also (b) that they may 
find it hard to formulate into words why they believe this to be so. Tacit knowledge is 
based on a range of information concerning the appearance, meaning and importance of a 
particular phenomenon (here, a trust object), and is thus also related to motivated 
reasoning, hunches and, precisely, leaps of faith. Two important qualifiers here are, first, 
that this is not to claim that some people do not have very well-thought through positions 
in relation to criminal justice institutions that would not be well covered by the idea of 
tacit knowledge; and second, that this is plainly a two-way street. People may believe the 
police ineffective and/or not well intentioned, in which case they would distrust this 
institution. They may also feel they lack any knowledge whatsoever, and would thus take 
a neutral stance in relation to issues of trust. Yet, this latter case seems to be empirically 
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unusual, in that a large majority of people, when pressed for example in the context of a 
survey interview, will come down on one side or the other, a fact that may relate to the 
relative importance of criminal justice institutions in people’s social, political and often 
personal lives. 
 A final point to be made in relation to the model of trust outlined above is that, at 
least when engaging in quantitative research, using several related attitude statements to 
construct attitudinal scales would appear preferable to asking a single ‘catch-all’ question 
to assess trust in the police. Single indicator measures of trust are appealing to policy 
makers for their simplicity and have, consequently, been used in, for example, many UK 
studies of attitudes to the police (e.g. Kautt 2011; Merry et al. 2012; Myhill and Bradford 
2012). They are also useful in the context of cross-national comparisons, not least 
because they side-step issues of measurement equivalence. However the multi-item/scale 
construction approach is likely to be more robust in most instances, both 
methodologically, since it allows more accurate measurement of the underlying construct, 
and theoretically; as we have discussed there different components of trust, and 
qualitative research has shown that people can have high trust in some elements or aspect 
of criminal justice agencies and low trust in others (Stone et al., 2005). While in a general 
sense people can be said to have trust (or not) in an institution, it is also important to 
recognize that they can and do take quite nuanced approaches to thinking about the 
police, courts or other actors (Stoutland 2001). 
 
Sources of trust 
Thus far we have argued that trust in the police and courts is, while broadly cognitive, 
likely to be premised on a wide variety of attitudes, motivations and experiences. We turn 
now to consideration of the empirical evidence. What seem to be the most important 
factors shaping trust in justice authorities? What influences what people think they know 
in relation to the abilities and intentions of criminal justice institutions? We concentrate 
in particular on the police for the simple reason that this is where the bulk of the evidence 
lies. 
There is indeed a voluminous literature on the factors shaping public trust in the 
police. This body of work originated primarily in the US but is increasingly international 
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in scope, and includes many studies conducted in the UK (e.g. Brandl et al. 1994; 
Bradford et al. 2009; Brown and Benedict 2002; Hinds and Murphy 2007; Merry et al. 
2012; Myhill and Bradford 2012; Sindall and Sturgis 2013; Skogan 2012; Sun et al. 
2013). Some highly consistent messages have emerged from research on public attitudes 
toward, and trust in, the police. 
After a comprehensive review of the extant literature Brown and Benedict (2002) 
concluded that only three individual level variables – age, ethnicity, and contact with 
officers – are consistently associated with attitudes toward the police, and although 
precise findings vary from study to study there has been little to contradict this position 
since then. All else equal, it seems that across many different contexts older people trust 
police somewhat more than younger people, people from some ethnic and other minority 
groups trust the police less than people from the majority group, and people who have 
had recent contact with the police evince, on average, lower levels of trust.  
The issue of ethnicity is interesting in this context. Studies in the United States 
have almost universally found that trust in the police is lower among black and other 
minority groups than among the white majority (Brown and Benedict 2002; Skogan 
2006), and similar findings have been reported in many other contexts: see for example 
Murphy and Cherney (2012) in Australia, and Zauberman and Lévy (2003) and Fassin 
(2013) in France. Yet, the negative association between minority status and lower trust is 
not universal, and there can moreover be significant variation between different minority 
groups. The best evidence of this latter phenomenon comes from the UK. Jackson et al. 
(2013) show, for example, that net of a wide range of relevant controls trust in the 
fairness and engagement of police in London (broadly speaking, then, perceptions 
concerning the intentions of the police) is lower among the black Caribbean, mixed black 
Caribbean and white, and ‘other mixed’ ethnic groups than among the white British 
group; but levels of trust are higher among many other minority ethnic groups, most 
notably those of South Asian origin. 
While it might be argued that these results, and other similar findings (e.g. 
Bradford 2011), suggest that the UK is simply an outlier in international terms, they do 
caution against simply assuming that trust in police is always lower among minority 
group members. One relevant factor, as suggested by Weitzer (2010; 2014) may be the 
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‘mode of incorporation’ (2010: 340) of different minority groups (see Bobo 1999). Put 
simply, minority groups are differentially stratified across different societies, and within 
the same society over time, and the extent to which they are alienated from social 
institutions – and perhaps particularly the police – will vary as a function of the particular 
histories of exclusion or repression (or inclusion and incorporation) they have 
experienced (Weitzer 2010). It is notable in the British case that the black Caribbean 
groups has both one of the longest histories of any minority group in the UK and the most 
obviously problematic structural and cultural position vis a vis the police. In the terms 
developed in this article the black Caribbean community can point to many years of 
negative direct experiences of police (Hall et al. 1978; Keith 1993; Bowling and Philips 
2002) and, as a result, has arguably developed an oppositional culture toward police that 
diminishes trust because it assigns police and community to different social categories. 
The relationship between ethnicity and trsut in police is therefore more complex 
and nuanced than is often assumed. By contrast the evidence concerning the association 
between personal contact with officers and trust in the police is among the most reliably 
replicated findings in criminological research. The primary mechanism explaining this 
association appears to be the procedural fairness of police action. That is, when people 
feel police with whom they have interacted have treated them with dignity and respect, 
have communicated with them openly, and have made decisions in an unbiased fashion, 
they are more likely to place trust in the police; conversely, when people feel they have 
been unfairly treated they are less likely to trust police (Bradford et al. 2009; Myhill and 
Bradford 2012; Van Damme et al 2015). While questions of instrumental effectiveness 
are not entirely unimportant they usually appear to play a secondary role in comparison to 
the core issue of fairness. Importantly, the effect of contact on trust appears to be 
asymmetrical (Skogan 2006). While unsatisfactory (unfair) contacts tend to have a large 
negative effect on trust, satisfactory (fair) contact have a significantly smaller positive 
effect. Expectancy disconfirmation is often given as a reason for this phenomena – much 
research has been conducted in the US, UK and similar developed countries, and people 
in these contexts generally expect to be fairly treated by police and are likely, therefore, 
to react particularly strongly to being unfairly treated. 
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Studies have also demonstrated that the experience of procedural fairness during 
interactions with police officers, and indeed judges and other court officials – is 
particularly strongly associated with trust in the intentions of these authorities, or what 
Tyler and colleagues call ‘motive-based trust’ (e.g. Tyler and Huo 2002). When people 
are treated in a procedurally just manner by police they are encouraged to form the view 
that these officers have the right motivations toward and have their interests at heart – 
unfairness, of course, indicates the opposite.  
In addition to the three individual level variables, Brown and Benedict also 
identified a ‘contextual level’ variable consistently with public attitudes: type of 
neighbourhood. This conclusion has, again, been reproduced by many pieces of research 
since their review (e.g. Jackson et al. 2013; MacDonald et al. 2007; Schuck et al. 2008). 
While the precise reason for this remains elusive, area-level variables such as 
disadvantage, social cohesion, collective efficacy and disorder are consistently found to 
correlate with trust in the police. It has been suggested by Sampson (2004, Sampson and 
Bartusch, 1998) and others (e.g. Gau and Brunson, 2010) that negative attitudes to the 
police in deprived neighbourhoods may be caused in part by ‘order-maintenance’ styles 
of policing used to try to address the problems of crime and disorder that often typify 
such areas; in essence, poor areas receive heavy and aggressive policing that alienates 
local residents and undermines trust in the police. 
 Another approach has been to think about what low-level disorder and its 
correlates social cohesion and collective efficacy mean for local residents (Bradford and 
Myhill 2015; Jackson et al. 2013; Jackson and Bradford 2009; Jackson and Sunshine 
2007). On this account police and police activity provides an explanatory tool for 
understanding how order and cohesion are maintained over time (Girling et al. 2000), and 
police are thus embedded in a particular kind of value-bearing narrative that revolves 
around both people’s sense of the quality of order and cohesion the experience in their 
neighbourhood and the importance they place on maintaining this order and cohesion. 
Experiences that support this narrative, such as cohesive, well-ordered neighbourhoods, 
increase trust because they work with and contribute to stories people tell themselves 
about police which suggest they are effective and well intentioned (that they are ‘doing 
the right thing’). Experiences or impressions of disorder, or of community breakdown, by 
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contrast diminish trust because they undermine the narrative of policing – they suggest 
that there is a failure to maintain order and cohesion, and the police are implicated in this 
perceived failure (Jackson and Sunshine 2007; Jackson et al. 2013). Naturally, it has been 
noted with some irony that, in this regard at least, police may gain or loose trust as a 
result of social processes over which they have very little control. The quality of order 
and cohesion in local area is a function of a set of social processes far larger than the 
activities of the uniformed police (Bradford et al. 2014). 
 
Trust and legitimacy 
In this final section we consider some of the similarities and differences between trust 
and legitimacy in the context of the justice system, and highlight why each might 
differentially motivate cooperation with  legal authorities and compliance with the law.  
Out of all public institutions, legal authorities have a unique position in society: 
they provide simultaneously a service that one can opt in or opt out of (for example when 
deciding on whether to report a crime) and a system of regulation to which one has to 
submit (or face the consequences). This power to protect/serve and detain/coerce 
complicates the nature of the interdependence of trustee and trustor. Trust in legal 
authorities involves the consideration of both (i) the future behaviour of specific 
individual actors whom one can come to rely upon for valued actions or outcomes, and 
(ii) beliefs about the behaviour of ‘role-holders’ (e.g. police officers, judges) in relation to 
social regulation and the production of order. Trusting the police to be procedurally fair 
might translate, for instance, into the positive expectation that one would be treated with 
respect and dignity if one were to report a crime, but also into the positive expectation 
that one would not be treated with disrespect and a lack dignity if one were to be 
approached by an officer to be questioned and possibly searched. And police need the 
trust of the citizen in the former case but not, necessarily, in the latter (although it is 
certainly true that trust will ‘oil the wheels’ when invasive powers are used). 
The behaviour of police and courts also has implications between the generation 
and reproduction of trust. The coercive powers that underpin justice institutions make 
them significant representatives of the state, enabling them to send out messages of 
inclusion or exclusion to citizens in a way that other public services simply cannot. The 
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behavior of police officers carries identity relevant information that people use to help 
constitute and shape their sense of self (Blader and Tyler 2009; Tyler and Blader 2000). 
Broadly speaking, fairness indicates inclusion, status and belonging, thus strengthening 
shared group identities (between police and citizen, and possibly also between citizen and 
citizen). Fairness also indicates that police are behaving in morally acceptable ways and 
thus that they are valid and appropriate group representatives, and there is a reflexive 
aspect to this process, too. People judge police behavior against established norms of 
probity and fairness, and actively assess whether police can and should be considered 
representative of their group. 
The power that legal authorities possess also brings legitimacy sharply into focus. 
While trust represents people’s positive expectations regarding police intentions and 
capabilities, legitimacy is the property or quality of possessing rightful power and the 
subsequent acceptance of – and willing deference to – authority in the eyes of citizens 
(Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Jackson, 2013). A subjective sense of duty to obey is embedded 
within the construct of legitimacy because people who believe the police are entitled to 
their coercive authority feel, accordingly, that citizens should pay proper deference to that 
power. Duty to obey simultaneously arises from a sense that the institution has the right 
to power and is an active acceptance of the authority that a legitimate justice institution 
imbues. 
How, then, can we put ‘clear water’ between the notion of trust and the notion of 
legitimacy? One way is to consider trust as evaluations and expectations regarding 
normatively appropriate behaviour. Recall Hardin’s (2006: 17) statement: ‘To say we 
trust you means we believe you have the right intentions toward us and that you are 
competent to do what we trust you to do.’ If, in a given society, citizens largely trust the 
police to be effective and fair, then it can be claimed that in a general sense they believe 
police act in an appropriate manner. By contrast, we might say that legitimacy is the 
belief that an instiution has the right to power and is entitled to be obeyed, and that 
legitimacy emerges when subordinates deem power-holders tend to act in normatively 
appropriate ways (Jackson et al. 2012, 2013; Tyler & Jackson 2014; Bradford et al. 
2015). The principled justification of power emerges when an institution is judged to 
wield its authority in normatively appropriate ways – that is, when it is trusted. 
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Another way to compare the two constructs is to consider how trust and 
legitimacy might variously motivate behaviour. Thus far we have focused on the nature 
of trust in legal institutions and the factors implicated in its generation and reproduction. 
But the behavioural outcomes of trust (and legitimacy) are equally if not more factors 
important in criminological research, and it is important to delimit the motivational force 
of trust (and legitimacy). As PytlikZillig et al. (2015) argue, we need to bracket off trust 
from actions/relationships that relate to the involuntary and the coerced: “intrinsic 
motivation comes from internal states and can still be affected by external forces, but 
does not feel like one “should” or “must,” do something – as these latter terms describe 
more extrinsic motivational states (Deci et al., 1994). Thus, willingness implies an 
intrinsic motivational state and agency. It ceases to be if coercion is required.’ (p. 19). 
If we act in ways that are motivated by deterrence and threat of force, this is not 
trusting behaviour, which emerges instead out of a set of positive expectations about how 
officers will act (expectations that form an important part of the trusting relationship). For 
instance, people will be more willing to report a crime when they have some faith that 
officers will investigate, be professional, be fair, treat them respectfully, and so forth. 
This is faith with respect to “positive goods”: when one has positive expectations one 
sees, for example, the point of calling an emergency number to report a crime because the 
call will be answered and action will be taken. Trust is also the willingness to be 
vulnerable. When one has positive expectations, one might call the police in part because 
one assumes that when they officers will not be rude, disrespectful, biased, and so forth 
(and indeed that they will turn up in the first place). To trust is to assume that one will not 
receive bad treatment and bad outcomes in a particular situation; this ‘implies potentially 
attending to threats and adverse outcomes, and imagining the risks that would occur when 
making one’s self vulnerable’ (Cao, 2015: 14).  
Legitimacy, in contrast to trust, relates much more power and legal duties 
attached to citizenship. It brings back the notion of ‘should’, at least in as much as this 
concerns a positive sense of moral duty. When people believe that the police as an 
institution is moral, appropriate and proper – i.e. when they believe that the officers who 
represent the institution act in normatively acceptable ways – they believe that they, too, 
should act in normatively appropriate ways. Consider a citizen who is deciding whether 
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or not to report a crime to the police. The belief that officers act in normatively 
appropriate ways may active the corresponding civic sense that one, too, should act in 
normatively appropriate ways – one of which may be to assist the police. It may be that 
trust is a predictor of people’s willingness to engage in cooperative behaviour (like 
reporting a crime to the police) but that legitimacy is a also a predictor. People may be 
willing to report a crime because they have faith that officers would treat them fairly and 
use the information they provide in an effective way (a trusting motivation) but also 
because they believe that they, too, should act in a normatively appropriate way (a 
motivation based on legitimacy).  
 
Trust is important 
To conclude this article we return briefly to a point raised at its outset. Trust (and 
legitimacy) is important in predicting public cooperation with legal authorities. This 
provides an important instrumental motivation for those authorities to generate and 
maintain positive evaluations among those they govern. Both citizens and authority has 
much at stake in the trust relationship between them. In liberal democracies – and 
elsewhere – the effective functioning of the criminal justice system relies on this 
relationship. There are thus important instrumental reasons for both parties to maintain 
suc trust. 
Yet, equally if not more important is the idea that citizens deserve to be governed 
by justice insitutions they can trust. Feeling that the police and courts share their values, 
have the right intentions and maintain at least a baseline level of efficacy are important 
factors shaping not only people’s relationships with the police but also their ontoloigical 
security and sense of belonging (Loader and Walker 2007). Trust in important state 
institutions such as the police and courts can help people orientate themselves within and 
naviagate their ways through complex social environments. A lack of trust, on the other 
hand, might prompt a weaker sense of personal control and social embeddedness, as 
options for action are closed down and barriers are placed in the way of behaviours and 
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